Keith L. Knight v. Ross H. Chamberlain : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Keith L. Knight v. Ross H. Chamberlain : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fabian, Clendenin, Moffat & Mabey; O. Webster Adams; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Knight v. Chamberlain, No. 8623 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2757
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH L. KNIGHT, d.b.a. 
Knight Realty Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. No. 8623 
ROSS H. CHAMBERLAIN, F I 
Defendllnt and Respondent. IV! L £ 
-·· ... -.. A'( I. ... 19 D 
Clerk,·········.. ~1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT s"'Pre;;,~--c~~·······-... 
11, I.Jf, ......... 
eft ' 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY 
& 0. WEBSTER ADAMS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
801 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE _______________ :________________________ 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS________________________________________________ 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS______________________________________________ 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE NATURE OF THE SERVICE OR 
FOR WHOM IT IS RENDERED DETERMINE 
WHETHER OR NOT A CONTRACT EMPLOY-
ING A REAL ESTATE BROKER COMES 
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.______________ 3 
POINT II. EMPLOYMENT TO OBTAIN OPTIONS 
TO PURCHASE LAND COMES WITHIN THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.__________________________________________ 19 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION -------------------------------- 22 
STATUTES CITED 
UCA 1953, Sect. 25-5-4, subdiv. 5------------------------------------ 2 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
Anders~n v. Johnson, 1018 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725____ 8 
Arbuckle v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 272, 
4 p. 2d 978 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335____________________ 10 
Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 2d 640____________________ 14 
Clark v. Opp, 156 Ore. 197, 66 P. 2d 1179________________________ 5 
Corbin on Contracts \}_(>-_\ __ ~_,_~ __ ft.aE7_L/-3t....--V--<~'1--------20, 24 
Duckworth v. Schumacker, 135 Cal. App. 661, 27 P. 
2d 919 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
Hall v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 Pac. 756________________________ 4 
Howard v. D. W. Hobson Co., 176 P. 2d 715________________ 6 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P. 2d 134 ____________ 11, 13 
Owen v. Nat. Container Corp of Cal., 115 Cal. App. 
2nd 21, 251 P. 2d 765-------------------------------------------- 16 
Pac. S. W. Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 301 
p. 2d 825 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
Shanklin v. Hall, 100 Cal. 26, 34 Pac. 636____________________ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH L. KNIGHT, d.b.a. ) 
Knight Realty Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROSS H. CHAMBERLAIN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 8623 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Keith L. Knight, dba Knight Realty Company, 
commenced an action against Ross H. Chamberlain 
alleging that Chamberlain had "employed Knight's 
services to assemble options" in favor of Chamber-
lain on large tracts of land in Salt Lake County. 
Knight alleged that the reasonable value of services 
rendered was the sum of $3,450.00. At the conclusion 
of plaintiff's evidence, a motion to dismiss was made 
and the court, in granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss, found that plaintiff's evidence showed that 
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plaintiff was employed by defendant to obtain op-
tions granting to defendant the right, for a fixed 
period, to purchase real property in Salt Lake Coun-
ty and, there being no written instrument evidenc-
ing the agreement, such employment contract al-
leged by appellant was void by virtue of the pro-
1 vision of section 25-5-4 ( 5) Utah Code Annotated '!: 
1953. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Essentially, the testimony of Mr. Knight, as 
well as the exhibits attached, indicate that Mr. 
Knight was asked by Mr. Chamberlain to obtain , 
options for the purchase of real property in Salt 
Lake County [Tr. 92 and 93]. Mr. Knight answered 
in the affirmative when asked the question whether 
or not the bulk of his time was spent in obtaining 
options on real property [Tr. 93]. Exhibit 10 in-
dicates that of a total of twenty-two full days spent 
in Chamberlain's service, over seventeen days was 
spent in contacting land owners for the purpose 
of obtaining options. The appellant testified that 
Chamberlain stated he would pay Knight for his 
services. However, the terms and conditions were 
never discussed and Knight indicated that he never 
mentioned to Chamberlain . how n1uch he would 
charge per day or per hour for the service that he 
had rendered [Tr. 93]. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POIN'T 1 
THE NATURE OF THE SERVICE AND FOR 
WHOM IT IS RENDERED DETERMINE WHETHER 
OR NOT A CONTRACT EMPLOYING A REAL ESTATE 
BROKER COMES WITHIN THE S T A T U T E OF 
FRAUDS. 
POINT II 
EMPLOYMENT TO OBTAIN OPTIONS TO PUR-




THE N~TURE OF THE SERVICE AND FOR 
WHOM IT IS RENDERED DETERMINE WHETHER 
OR NOT A CONTRACT EMPLOYING A REAL ESTATE 
BROKER COMES WITHIN THE S T AT U T E OF 
FRAUDS. 
The appellant contends that the employment 
of services to be paid for in the event there is not 
a sale need not be in writing and maintains that 
the agreement in question was not an agreement 
for compensation for the purchase or sale of real 
estate, but an agreement that no compensation need 
be paid in the event a purchase or sale is consum-
mated. Appellant concedes that an action in quan-
tum meruit is not available to a broker who is em-
ployed to purchase or sell real estate where he fails 
to put the agreement in writing, but he maintains 
that where the employment is to render services 
connected with land and not for the purchase or 
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sale of land, a recovery for the reasonable value of 
the service can be had even though there is no mem-
orandum in writing. [Appellant's brief, page 13]. 
He cites several cases to support this proposition. 
Respondent maintains that the nature of the brok-
er's service and for whom it is rendered determines 
whether or not a contract employing a broker comes 
within the statute of frauds. 
Certainly every agreement connected with land 
does not come within the prohibition of the statute 
of frauds. A review of the cases will indicate the 
type of agreement the statute contemplates. 
The case of Hall v. Rankin, 22 Ariz. 13, 193 P. 
756 illustrates an agreement not contemplated by 
the statute of frauds. In that case it was alleged the 
defendant entered into the following agreement with 
plaintiff: 
"'I have been trying to sell the Henrietta 
mine to the Big Ledge people, but the mine 
must stand the inspection of Mr. Shockley, 
their engineer. I have had a "racket" with 
him and I cannot get them to go out and look 
over the property. You know these people, 
and I want you to get their engineer on 
the ground, and if I get $150,000 for it I will 
pay you $25,000 for your services, and if I 
sell it for less I will pay you very liberally, 
and in any event I will pay you for your 
trouble and expense.' " 
Appellant's brief contains a portion of the 
court's opinion, but does not include the following 
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language which is most important to clearly under-
stand the reasoning upon which the decision was 
based: 
"In this case the plaintiff, as agent, un-
dertook to perform for the defendant, who 
was not the owner of the mine, certain ser-
vices, and the defendant undertook to make 
compensation therefor. The plaintiff was em-
ployed to get the engineer of the Big Ledge 
Company-on the mine for the purpose of in-
spection; he was not em played to sell the mine 
-that was the business of the defendant. The 
only characteristic in the contract, indicating 
that the employment of the plaintiff was to 
sell real estate, is the stipulation that his 
compensation for his services should be $25,-
000 if the defendant sold the mine for $150,-
000, and if the mine was sold for a less amount 
that the plaintiff should be paid liberally. We 
think that this provision should be construed 
as fixing merely the 'measure' of the plain-
tiff's compensation and not that it is to be 
considered as one of the terms of a con tract 
for the sale of the mine." 
A similar case is the Oregon case of Clark v. 
Opp, 156 Ore. 197, 66 P. 2nd 1179. In that case 
the plaintiff was employed to go upon certain min-
ing property and tunnel, timber and develop the 
property and to expose and sample the ore bodies 
so that the mine could be exhibited to a prospective 
lessee. In the Clark case it is evident that the plain-
tiff was employed not to sell the property but as in-
dicated, to develop the property so that it could be 
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sold. The Clark case and the Hall case illustrate an 
agreement which contemplates a service not embrac-
ing the purchase or sale of real property. 
It is important in examing the broker's agree-
ment to determine whether or not the broker is deal-
ing with another real estate broker or agent, or is 
dealing or contracting with a prospective purchaser 
or seller of real property. The California case of 
Howard v. D. W. Hobson Company, 176 P. 2nd ' 
715 is illustrative of- a fact situation involving 
two real estate brokers engaged in a joint ven-
ture. In that case, the plaintiff informed repre-
sentatives of the defendant company that he could 
obtain an option to purchase property belonging to 
a Mrs. Moore for the sum of $25,000.00. Represen-
tatives of the defendant company agreed with the 
plaintiff that if he could secure the option, defen-
dant would endeavor to sell the land and would di-
vide any sums in excess· of the option price of $25,-
000.00, received pursuant to said sale. The defen-
dant raised the question of the statute of frauds 
alleging that the employment agreement was oral. 
The court stated: 
"That we may go further and hold that 
even if it were necessary to concede that the 
agreement in question in effect involved the 
employment of the plaintiff to purchase the 
Moore property for the defendant, still, since 
said agreement was between real estate brok-
ers and not between a broker and the owner 
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of land, it was not necessary to n1ake it valid 
that it should have conformed to the formali-
ties prescribed by subdivision 6 of Section 
1624 of the Civil Code." 
On rehearing the Supreme Court of California 
said: 
"PER CURIAM. The application for a 
hearing in this court after decision in the 
District Court of Appeal of the Third Appel-
late District is denied. 
In denying the application, vve deem it 
proper to say that we are not prepared to hoJ4 
that subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil 
Code is not applicable in the case of a simple 
con tract between a real estate agent or broker 
and a proposed purchaser to obtain an option 
for the purchase of real estate by the purchas-
er. The opinion clearly shows that this was in 
substance a joint venture on the part of plain-
tiff and defendant for the sale of real pro-
perty of a third party and the distribution of 
the profits betv;een them. The District Court 
of Appeal was clearly right in concluding 
that subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil 
Code does not extend to agreements between 
brokers to co-operate in making sales for the 
sake of the commission or profits and that 
this was substantially such a case." 
In Arbuckel v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 118 Cal. 
App. 272, -4, P. 2nd 978, the defendant corporation 
was a company engaged in the business of subdivid-
ing and improving tracts of real estate in the county 
of Los Angeles and employed two hundred salesmen 
for selling the properties subdivided. The defendant 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_employed the plaintiff as director of sales and man-
ager of real estate salesmen and agreed to pay plain- . 
tiff for his service a certain sum based on coramis-
sions received from sales concluded by the sales- ' 
men of the corporation. The Court, in regard to the 
employment contract, stated: 
"This contract, as we view it, is not the 
kind of contract or agreement to which refer-
ence is made by said section 1624. It contains 
no authorization to respondent to either pur-
chase or sell the property of appellant, but, 
on the contrary, simply makes him the busi-
ness manager of appellant for the purpose of 
aiding and assisting its salesman in dispos-
ing of its lands. As was said in the case of 
Pettibone v. Lake View Town Co., 134 Cal. 
227, 66 P. 218, 219, in holding that said sec-
tion 1624 had no application, 'The contract 
here involved is for the personal services of 
the plaintiff,' and so in the case at bar the 
compensation or commission agreed to be paid 
was in lieu of salary or wages for the person-
al services to be performed by respondent." 
The Utah case of Andersen v. Johnson, 108 
Utah 417, 160 P. 2nd 725 involved an action between 
a real estate broker and his agent. In that case, the 
defendant employed the plaintiff to obtain listings 
on property in Box Elder County and defendant 
agreed that in the event any of the land caused 
to be listed by plaintiff with defendant was sold the 
defendant would pay plaintiff one-third of the com-
mission realized. The court held that the contract 
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was one of employment and did not involve any 
right or interest in land. The court stated that: 
"'The contention of respondent that plain-
tiff cannot recover because his agreement was 
oral is untenable. The con tract was one of 
employment and not involving any right or 
interest in land. See Johnson v. Allen, Utah 
1945, 158 P. 2d 134. The proposition that a 
contract for fee or commission may be recov-
ered by agent from broker though not in writ-
ing is upheld in Arbuckle v. Clifford F. Reid, 
Inc., 1931. 118 Cal. App. 272, 4 P. 2d 978; 
" 
Having considered certain employment agree-
lnents and relationships not contemplated by the 
statute of frauds, consideration is now given to 
agreements and relationships various courts hold to 
be within the statute. In appellant's brief at page 
20 the following statement appears: 
"Thus it appears that specific employ-
ment to purchase or sell or to bind the princi-
pal is a necessary part of the employment of 
a broker in order to comply with the statute 
of frauds. Conversely, if the employment does 
not authorize the purchase or sale and does 
not authorize the agent to bind the principal 
there is no employment for the purchase or 
sale of real estate and the statute of frauds 
is not applicable at all." 
We cannot agree with appellant's position. The 
statute of frauds pertaining to brokers does not 
contemplate a situation where a broker is author-
ized to execute a conveyance of real property for a 
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seller or enter in to a written con tract binding his 
principal to purchase real property. Rather, the 
statute contemplates the employment of a broker to 
render services in connection with the procurement , 
by a broker of a bound seller or purchaser of real 
property. The Supreme Court of California, in the 
case of Shanklin v. Hall, 100 Cal. 26, 34 Pac. 636, 
commenting on a statute similar to our own stated: 
". . . Among the con tracts declared in-
valid, if not in writing, etc., by section 1624 
of the Civil Code is: "6. An agreement author-
izing or employing an agent or broker to pur-
chase or sell real estate for compensation or 
a commission." The contract set out in the 
complaint is embraced in the findings of the 
court which we have quoted, and it appears 
to possess all the elements essential to bring it 
within the purview of the statute. It is not 
necessary in the sense of the statute that he 
should have been authorized to execute a con-
veyance of defendant's real property. Bouv. 
Law Diet. "The duty assumed by a broker 
is to bring the minds of the buyer and seller 
to an agreement for a sale, and the price and 
terms on which it is to be made." . . ." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in 
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 18-1 P. 2d 335, said 
in reference to our statute: 
" ... It is different with the statute on 
broker's agreements. It proYides that any 
agreen1en t for the perforn1ance of services 
as a real estate broker shall be void unless in 
writing. The statute is as applicable to con-
tracts implied in law as any other. In effect 
10 
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it forbids any recovery for services in selling 
land which are are not provided for by writ-
ten agreement. See also Page on the Law 
of Contracts, Sec. 1413." 
The purpose of our statute of frauds relating 
' to broker agreements is to require a written contract 
of employn1ent between a broker and a purchaser 
or seller of real property. Where a principal wishes 
to sell real property it is not necessary that the land 
the principal desires the broker to sell be described 
with particularity. This issue was raised and decided 
in Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P. 2nd 134. 
In that case the defendant alleged that the listing 
agreer.aent did not contain an adequate description of 
real property. In answering this contention, the 
court said: 
"Sec. 33-5-4 (5), U.C.A. 1943, ex-
pressly provides that "Every agreement au-
thorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation" 
shall be void unless some "note or memoran-
dum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged." The construction of 
this section as to the sufficiency of a descrip-
tion of the real estate is apparently a matter 
of first impression in this state. The section 
is almost identical to Sec. 1624 ( 6) of the 
California Civil Code. In an early case the 
Supreme Court of California in construing 
this provision noted that its chief element was 
the employment. Toomy v. Dunphy, 86 Cal. 
639, 25 P. 130. The provision has subsequent-
ly been before the California courts many 
times. Many of the cases are cited in Pray v. 
11 
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Anthony, 96 Cal. App. 772, 27 4 P. 1024, 1026, ·~ 
wherein the court noted that; "As uniformly 
held by numerous decisions in this state upon 
the subject, the essential part of a contract 
to employ a real estate broker, so far as the 
statute of frauds is concerned, is the matter 
of the employment and consequently need not 
describe the land specifically if the terms of 
the employment can be made definite without 
it. The description of the land and its identity 
are only incidental to the main purpose of the 
contract, and, since contracts of that nature 
do not purport to involve the title or right of 
possession of land, much greater liberality is 
allowed in construing and curing defective 
descriptions therein than in cases of execu-
tory contracts to convey land or in deeds of 
grant, for, as stated, so far as the statute of 
frauds is concerned, the terms of the employ-
ment are the essential parts. The well-estab-
lished rule is, therefore, that broker's con-
tracts are not to be declared void merely be-
cause of a defect, uncertainty or ambiguity 
in the description of the property to be sold, 
when such defect can be cured by allagations 
and proof of extrinsic facts or circun1stances." 
This doctrine was approved by the Supreme 
Court in Needham v. Abbot Kinney Co., 217 
Cal. 72, 17 P. 2d 109." 
In many situations a purchaser employing a 
broker does not know exactly what property he 
wishes to purchase and consequently a property de-
scription could not be included in an employment 
contract, nor does the statute require a land des-
cription. 
The statute of frauds relating to brokers agree-
12 
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ments deals with an employment contract as stated 
in Johnson v. Allen; supra. 
"The contention that the contract was 
void because of the fact that the wife, who 
under Idaho community property law was a 
part owner of the land, did not sign the con-
tract is based on a statute relating solely to 
transfers or contracts to transfer an interest 
in the land itself. This was a contract of em-
ployment and did not purport to convey an 
interest in land. The defendant, by this con-
tract, employed the plaintiff to find a pur-
chaser for certain lands. When plaintiff did 
the work he was entitled to the commission 
agreed upon whether the land was sold or not, 
whether defendant owned the land or not. No 
case has been cited and we have found none 
holding that such a listing contract is void 
unless signed by the wife. The Utah Statute 
of Frauds does not require that such a con-
tract be signed by the "owner" of the lands 
listed, but only that it be signed "by the party 
to be charged." Defendant employed plaintiff 
to do certain work by a valid written con-
tract. Plaintiff did the work and is entitled 
to the agreed compensation." 
The Utah case of Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 
188 P. 2nd 640, sets forth the type of service con-
templated by the statute and the terms and condi-
tions required to be in writing : 
" 'The courts generally hold that under 
such a statute a real estate broker or agent 
cannot recover commission for services ren-
dered in either selling or procuring a pur-
chaser for real property unless it appears: 
( 1) That there is an express con tract or 
13 
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agreement of authority in which the terms 
and conditions of his employment, if any, and 
the amount of his commission, etc., are stated; 
(2) that such contract be in writing; (3) 
that in the absence of such an express con .. 
tract no recovery can be had for the reason-
able value of the services rendered as upon 
a quantum meruit, nor for the money and 
time expended for the use and benefit of the 
owner of the property.' " 
We wish to emphasize that a real estate broker 
in order to recover compensation for services ren-
dered in procuring a seller of real property, must 
produce a written agreement setting forth the terms 
and conditions of his employment and the amount 
of his compensation, not the terms and conditions 
of his authority to bind his principal. 
Having considered that the function of a brok-
is primarily to bring about a purchase or sale of 
real property by bringing a purchaser and seller 
to an agreement regarding an exchange or sale of 
real property and haYing discussed cases indicating 
that such an employment contract must be in writ-
ing, let us next consider the meaning of the statu-
tory term "purchase or sale". Several California 
cases have construed this term. In DuckH'otth v. 
Schumacher, 135 Cal. App. 661, 27 P. 2nd 919, ac-
cording to the complaint, the plaintiff \vas to assist 
and aid the defendant in laying out for subdivision and 
subdividing for sale certain lands of the defendant 
and to act as defendant's general sales n1anager in 
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charge of the advertising of said subdivision and de-
vising ways and means of promoting the sale of said 
tract and superintending the sale thereof at a stated 
salary per week. The defendant-appellant contended 
that by the very terms of the contract it fell squarely 
within the provisions of the California statute of 
frauds which provided that an agreement employ-
ing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation is invalid unless in writing. The 
Court stated: 
" ... Stating the proposition otherwise, 
the plaintiff was to aid and assist the defen-
dant in the preliminary work of laying out a 
subdivision and subdividing a certain tract 
of land owned by the defendant; to plan and 
carry out an advertising promotional scheme 
looking to the sale of the land; to act as sales 
manager; superintend the sale of said tract. 
the contract in its entirety looked to the sale 
of said tract through the agency of said plain-
tiff and by the means conceived and devised 
by the plaintiff, all to the end that defendant 
might sell his said tract through the medium 
of and by the activities of the plaintiff. Such 
employment, therefore, had for its sole object 
and purpose the sale of the real property, and 
such an employment is within the inhibition 
of section 1624 of the Civil Code. To hold 
otherwise would give rise to a practice of in-
genious forms, without substances in fact, 
and thus avoid the very salutary rule of law 
as declared in section 1624 of the Civil Code, 
and open the door to fraud, long closed by said 
statute, and would in effect abrogate such 
15 
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statute of frauds ( Civ. Code, Sec. 1624 ... 
If one assists either in the purchase or sale 
o~ real estate on a contract for compensation 
~1ther by commission or salary, he falls with-
In the inhibitions provided in said section to 
the same extent and in the same manner as 
though he had been the sole and exclusive me-
dium through which the purchase or sale was 
made. We think that the terms "employed to 
sell or purchase" should and does include to 
aid and assist in the purchase or sale, and it 
seems to us that to state otherwise would be 
equivalent to saying that the whole does not 
include all of its parts. Shanklin v. Hall, su-
pra; Dolan v. O'Toole, supra. Measured by 
this standard, all the testimony in the record 
shows that plain tiff was to aid and assist 
defendant in the sale of real estate, and such 
was the purpose of his employment. The evi-
dence, therefore, was insufficient to support 
the findings of the court and the judgment, 
there being no evidence that the contract was 
in writing, that the contract was of such a 
nature as to require it to be in \vriting or 
some note or memorandum thereof in writing 
and signed by the party to be charged. 
The judgment is reversed." 
Appellant in his brief has referred to the case 
of OU'cn v. National Container Corp of California, 
115 Cal. App. 2nd 21, 251 P. 2nd 765. In that case the 
plaintiff alleged that defendants employed plaintiff 
to locate a suitable industrial site in Los Angeles; 
that the plaintiff \Yas to develop surveys for defen-
dant on labor conditions, transportation matters, fi-
16 
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nancial arrangements and further, plaintiff was to 
negotiate and assist defendants in the preparation of 
engineering drawings on various proposed factory 
layouts and further to negotiate on behalf of defen-
dants with the Federal Manufacturing District, Inc., 
of Los Angeles, respecting the proposed plant to be 
constructed by defendants in that District. The lower 
court dismissed the complaint and on appeal the 
appellate court held that an employment of a broker 
to negotiate and assist a third party in effecting a 
purchase of real property for compensation would 
be invalid unless in writing. The court went on to 
say: 
"An employment of plaintiff merely tq 
give defendants information as to available 
factory sites would not have to be in writing. 
Wilson v. Morton, 85 Cal. 598, 24 P. 784. An 
employment of plaintiff "to locate a suitable 
industrial site," without any duty on his part 
to bring the parties together or to negotiate 
or assist in a purchase would not be an em-
ployment to purchase real property . . . " 
" ... Plaintiff has pleaded a most unusual 
agreement under which he was to locate a site 
but not negotiate for or otherwise assist in its 
purchase . . . " 
"We may say, however, in conclusion, 
that if the court should find that the services 
alleged were merely incidental to plain tiff's 
efforts to bring about a sale of real property 
to defendant, and that there was no express 
agreement of defendant to pay for the same, 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff cannot prevail in this action, either 
upon contract or in quantum meruit." 
And finally we refer to the case of Pacific-
Southwest Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 301 P. 
2nd 825. In that case the plaintiff contended that 
an agreement authorizing or employing a broker 
to obtain an option to purchase real property did 
not come within the statute of frauds. The court 
held that in California an option to purchase real 
property had been held to come within the statute 
of frauds and must be in writing, and further 
stated: 
"In determining the nature of the ser-
vices which will bring an employment contract 
within the statute, the phrase" to sell or pur-
hcase" includes "to aid or assist in the pur-
hcase or sale" of real estate. Hooper v. May-
field, 114 Cal. App. 2d 802, 806, 251 P. 2d 
330; Duckworth v. Schumacher, 135 Cal. App. 
661, 666, 27 P. 2d 919. Such broad construc-
tion of the term conforms \Yith one of the 
primary purposes of the statute, the protec-
tion of real estate owners from the assertion 
of false claims by brokers and agents. Toomy 
v. Dnnphy, 86 Cal. 639, 642, 25 P. 130; also 
Gorham v. Heiman, 90 Cal. 346, 27 P. 289; 
Hooper z·. llfayficld, supra, 114 Cal. App. _2d 
330. Likewise, the procurement of an option 
agreement for the purchase of real property 
is a contract that aids or assists in the pur-
chase or sale of real property, and properly 
comt"'s \vithin the provisions of the statute. 
Accordingly, a contract employing a broker 
to obtain an option for the purchase of real 
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property, like a con tract em playing a broker 
.to purchase or sell real property, Steiner v. 
Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 717, 221 P. 2d 9; 
Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corp., supra, 
comes within the statute and must be in writ-
ing. To hold otherwise would open the door 
to the assertion of unfounded claims by brok-
ers and others on the pretense of oral employ-
ment in real estate transactions relative to 
options, and so frustrate the purpose of the 
statute. 
In the instant case the appellant was dealing 
with a prospective purchaser of real property. His 
evidence indicates that the majority of his time was 
spent in contacting the owners of real property to 
obtain from them an option to purchase pro-
perty. We think that all of his efforts were calcu-
lated to effectuate and to bring about a sale of real 
property and consequently because there is no agree-
ment of employment in writing he is not entitled 
to recover for the service rendered. 
POINT II 
EMPLOYMENT TO OBTAIN OPTIONS TO PUR-
CHASE LAND COMES WITHIN 'THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
The authorities are divided on this problem. 
The appellant has cited cases which hold that the 
employment of a broker to obtain options to pur-
chase land does not come within the statute of 
frauds. The courts that so hold reason that an option 
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simply a contract by which the owner of property 
agrees with another than he shall have the right to 
buy his property at a fixed price within a time 
certain. They reason that an owner does not sell his 
land, that he does not then agree to sell it; but that 
all he sells is the right or privilege to buy at the 
election or option of the other party. The second 
party gets in praesenti, not land, or an agreement 
that he shall have land, but he does get something of 
value, i.e., the right to call for and receive land, if 
he elects. 
Corbin, in his work on contracts, maintains 
that options to buy lands are contracts and that 
options to purchase create an interest in the land. In 
volume 2 of Corbin on Contracts at pages 438, 439, 
and 441, the following statements appear: 
"If a broker is employed to procure an 
option on land, the contract would seem to be 
within the statute unless the statute clearly 
distinguishes between conditional and uncon-
ditional contracts. In obtaining an option, the 
employer desires and gets a contract right to 
a conveyance of land, even though it is sub-
ject to a condition that he is not bound to per-
form .... 
"It is clear from all this that a binding 
option is a conditional contract for the future 
conveyance of land. It is usually a unilateral 
con tract, by Yirtue of a seal or some execu~d 
consideration; but it may be bilateral, as m 
the case of a lease \Vith option to buy, in 
which the consideration is a return promise 
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by the lessee to pay rent. Probably _it is the 
unilateral character of most options that is 
the chief reason for confusion, for many have 
been very slow to grasp the nature of a uni-
lateral con tract; but an additional reason is 
found in the fact that the holder's right is 
subject to a condition precedent, and many 
have erroneously asserted that until the con-
dition is performed there is no contract .... 
"If a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute shows that it was intended to apply 
to all cases in which the broker is employed 
to negotiate a contract for the purchase and 
sale of land, including unilateral and condi-
tional contracts, then it should have been held 
applicable in the Oregon case. The question 
whether an option contract in itself creates 
an interest in the land is considered in an-
other section. . . . '' 
It would seem that a reasonable interpretation 
of our statute would show that it was intended to 
apply to all cases where a broker is employed to 
negotiate a contract for the purchase and sale of 
land, including unilateral and conditional contracts. 
Certainly, the activities of the broker in both 
situations are the same. To hold that a broker 
employed to obtain options does not come within 
the provisions of the statute of frauds would open 
the door to the assertion of unfounded claims by 
brokers and others in real estate transactions and 
frustrate the purpose of the statute. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The appellant's argument may be summarized,~ 
as follows : . 
1. Because the appellant was not authorized 
to purchase any land for the respondent and was 
given no authority to bind the respondent in any 
particular, there was no employment for the pur-
chase or sale of real estate and where the employ-
ment is to render services connected with land only, 
and not for the purchase or sale of land, recovery. 
for the reasonable value of services can be had even 
though there is no memorandum in writing. 
2. Employment to obtain options to buy land 
is not within the statute of frauds. 
Care should be exercised to determine the na-
ture of the employment contract. For example, if 
a broker employs an agent to obtain listings on pro-
perty so as to enable the broker to sell property 
this clearly is not within the statute. If two brokers 
undertake a joint venture for their mutual advan-
tage, this has been held not to come within the 
statue. However, where a broker is dealing with 
a third party, the authorities state that service ren-
dered by a broker which aids or assists his principal 
to purchase or sell real estate comes within the 
terms of the statute. 
We think that the services performed by the 
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appellant in this case were calculated to bring about 
a sale of real property to the plaintiff. We reject 
appellant's contention that because he was not auth-
orized to bind the defendant there was no employ-
ment for the purchase or sale of real property. A 
broker's task is to bring the minds of the buyer and 
seller of property to an agreement concerning the 
terms, conditions and sale of real property and not 
to act as agent with a power of attorney to enter 
into agreement binding his principal. Our courts 
have held that under such a statute as ours, a real 
estate broker or agent cannot recover compensation 
for services rendered unless there is an express con-
tract or agreement of employment in which the 
terms and conditions of employment, if any, and 
the amount of compensation are stated and that 
such a contract must be in writing. Appellant testi-
fied that he would look to the seller of property for 
his compensation in the event a sale was consum-
ated, but in the event a sale was not concluded, it 
was his understanding that respondent would pay 
him ·for his services. If, as appellant contends 
this particular situation takes the agreement out 
of the statute of frauds, then it is entirely possible, 
wherever real estate brokers have unsuccessfully 
rendered services to prospective purchasers of pro-
perty, for those brokers to commence actions based 
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on oral agreements to recover in quantum meruit 
for services rendered. We maintain that this is 
the exact situation the statute of frauds seeks to 
avoid. 
Respectfully sumi tted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY 
& 0. WEBSTER ADAMS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
801 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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